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Abstract
In this paper, we accomplish two objectives: First, we provide a new mathematical characterization of
the value function for impulse control problems with implementation delay and present a direct solution
method that differs from its counterparts that use quasi-variational inequalities. Our method is direct, in the
sense that we do not have to guess the form of the solution and we do not have to prove that the conjectured
solution satisfies conditions of a verification lemma. Second, by employing this direct solution method, we
solve two examples that involve decision delays: an exchange rate intervention problem and a problem of
labor force optimization.
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1. Introduction
Implementation delays occur naturally in decision-making problems. Many corporations face
regulatory delays, which need to be taken into account when the corporations make decisions
under uncertainty. A decision made will be carried out only after certain amount of time elapses,
for example, due to regulatory reasons. The decision involves optimally exercising a real option
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or optimally manipulating (with some associated cost) a state variable, which is the source of
uncertainty. Several problems that fit into this framework can be found in the literature: The
work of Bar-Ilan and Strange [6] constitutes the first study considering how delays affect rational
investment behavior. Keppo and Peura [17] consider the decision making problem a bank has
to solve when it is faced with a minimum capital requirement, a random income, and delayed
(and costly) recapitalization. The bank’s problem is to determine when to raise capital from its
shareholders and the amount to be raised, given that this transaction requires a heavy preparatory
work, which causes delay. Bar-Ilan and Strange [7] consider (irreversible) sequential (2 stage)
investment decision problems given two sources of delay: one due to market analysis in the first
stage and the other due to construction of a production facility in the second stage. In each stage
the firm’s problem is to decide whether to continue entering into the market (of that product)
or to abandon it. See also Subramanian and Jarrow [24] who consider the problem of a trader
(who is not a price taker) who wants to liquidate her position and encounters execution delays
in an illiquid market. Alvarez and Keppo [3] study the impact of delivery lags on irreversible
investment demand under revenue uncertainty. Øksendal et al. [20,15] consider the classical
stochastic control of stochastic delay systems.
The problem of finding an optimal decision (in the presence of delays) can be characterized
as a stochastic impulse control problem or an optimal stopping problem. In the papers cited
above the impulse control problem or the optimal stopping problem were solved by using a
system of quasi-variational inequalities. (See e.g. Bensoussan and Lions [8] and Øksendal and
Sulem [21] for the relationship between control problems and quasi-variational inequalities.)
In a different approach, Øksendal and Sulem [22] solve a version of delay problems, in which
the controller decides on the magnitude of control at the time of decision-making before any
delay (the decision is implemented after some delay). They convert the optimal impulse control
problem with delayed reaction into a no-delay optimal stopping/impulse control problem. Note
that choosing the control in this way introduces strong path dependence of the controlled
process.
Here, we solve the impulse control problems with delays directly and the magnitude of the
impulses are chosen at the time of action, not at the time of decision-making, by providing a new
characterization of the value function. The controlled process is a non-Markov process in this
case, too, since, depending on when a point in the state space is reached, it has different roles.
But the controlled process in this case regenerates after a decision is implemented, and the value
of the state process during the delay time depends on the past only through the value of the state
process at the time of decision-making. We will only consider threshold and band policies in this
paper, since we expect that the non-Markovian structure will make finding the optimal solution
much more difficult if we allow more general strategies. For example, because of the lack of the
Strong Markov property, we were unable to prove the concavity properties of the value function
when the admissible strategies were a superset of band or threshold strategies.
Our results rely on the works of Dynkin [13,14] (see e.g. Theorem 16.4) and Dayanik and
Karatzas [12], who give a general characterization of optimal stopping times of one dimensional
diffusions, and on the work of Dayanik and Egami [11], who characterize the value function
of stochastic impulse control problems. Our method is direct, in the sense that we do not have
to guess the form of the solution and we do not have to prove that the conjectured solution
satisfies conditions of a verification lemma as all the methods in the above literature do. Other
works similar in vein to ours that provide different characterizations of the value function of
impulse/singular control problems for one dimensional diffusions rather than solving variational
inequalities are Alvarez [1,2], Alvarez and Virtanen [4], and Weerasinghe [25].
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We give a geometric characterization of the value function, specifically, we find very general
conditions on the reward function and the coefficients of the underlying diffusion under which
the value function can be linearized (in the continuation region) after a suitable transformation.
Then the problem of determining the value function is equivalent to determining the slope (if
admissible strategies are threshold strategies), the slope and the intercept (if admissible strategies
are band strategies) from first order conditions. To show the efficacy of our methodology we
apply it to an optimization problem of a central bank that needs to carry out exchange rate
intervention (this is the Krugman model of interest rates considered, among others, in Mundaca
and Øksendal [18]) when there is delay in the implementation of its decisions. Also, using our
methodology we will find optimal hiring and firing decisions of a firm that faces stochastic
demand and has to conform to regulatory delays. Other works that deal with labor optimization
problems are Bentolila and Bertola [9], and Shepp and Shiryaev [23] who model firing and hiring
decisions as singular controls. It is also worth pointing out that an impulse control study when
the underlying process is a superposition of a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process
(when the jumps are of phase type) is given by Bar-Ilan et al. [5] with management of foreign
exchange reserves and labor optimization in mind.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a characterization of
general threshold strategies with implementation delays and provide an easily implemented
algorithm to find the value function and the optimal control. To illustrate our methodology,
we will solve a delayed version of an example from Mundaca and Øksendal [18] (also see
Øksendal [19]). A similar problem to the one we consider was solved in Øksendal and Sulem [22]
in which the controller decides on the magnitude of control at the time of decision-making before
any delay. In Section 3, we work with a band policy. In this section we work on the specific
example of optimal hiring and firing decisions rather than providing a general characterization
for the value function. We again provide an easily implemented algorithm to find the optimal
control. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
2. Optimal threshold strategies
Let (Ω ,F,P) be a complete probability space with a standard Brownian motion W =
{Wt ; t ≥ 0} and consider the diffusion process X0 with state pace I = (c, d) ⊆ R and dynamics
dX0t = µ(X0t )dt + σ(X0t )dWt (2.1)
for some Borel functions µ : I → R and σ : I → (0,∞). (We assume that the functions µ
and σ are sufficiently regular so that (2.1) makes sense.) Here we take c and d to be a natural
boundaries. We use “0” as the superscript to indicate that X0 is the uncontrolled process. We
denote the infinitesimal generator of X0 by A and consider the ODE (A − α)v(x) = 0. This
equation has two fundamental solutions, ψ(·) and ϕ(·). We set ψ(·) to be the increasing and ϕ(·)
to be the decreasing solution. ψ(c+) = 0, ϕ(c+) = ∞ and ψ(d−) = ∞, ϕ(d−) = 0 because
both c and d are natural boundaries. First, we define an increasing function
F(x) , ψ(x)
ϕ(x)
. (2.2)
Next, following Dynkin [14], p. 238, we define concavity of a function with respect F as follows:
A real valued function u is called F-concave on (c, d) if, for every c < l < r < d and x ∈ [l, r ],
u(x) ≥ u(l) F(r)− F(x)
F(r)− F(l) + u(r)
F(x)− F(l)
F(r)− F(l) .
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Suppose that at any time t ∈ R+ and any state x ∈ R+, we can intervene and give the system
an impulse ξ ∈ R. Once the system gets intervened, the point moves from x to y ∈ R+ with
associated reward and cost. An impulse control for the system is a double sequence,
ν = (T1, T2, . . . Ti . . . ; ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξi . . .) (2.3)
where 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < · · · is an increasing sequence of F-stopping times such that Ti+1−Ti ≥ ∆,
and ξ1, ξ2 . . . are F(Ti+∆)− measurable random variables representing impulses exercised at the
corresponding intervention times Ti with ξi ∈ Z for all i where Z ⊂ R is a given set of admissible
impulse values. The controlled process until the first intervention time is described as follows:{
dX t = µ(X t )dt + σ(X t )dWt , 0 ≤ t < T1 +∆
XT1+∆ = Γ (X(T1+∆)−, ξ1) (2.4)
with some mapping Γ : (c, d) × R → R. We consider the following performance measure
associated with ν ∈ V (= a collection of admissible strategies),
J ν(x) = Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (Xs)ds +
∑
Ti<∞
e−α(Ti+∆)K (X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]
. (2.5)
The objective (we shall call it the delay problem) is to find the optimal strategy ν∗ (if it exists)
and the value function:
v(x) , sup
ν∈V
J ν(x) = J ν∗(x). (2.6)
Remark 2.1. The controlled process X is not a Markov process, since depending on whether
a point is reached in the time interval [Ti , Ti + ∆) or not, that point has different roles. (The
controlled process might jump or not at a given point depending on how it reaches to that point.)
However, (1) the process regenerates at times {Ti + ∆}i∈N, and (2) the value of the process at
time T ∈ (Ti , Ti+∆), XT , depends on the information up to Ti ,FTi , only through the value of the
process at time Ti , XTi . Instead of finding the optimal strategy for a non-Markov process, we will
use the hints of Markovian features to find the optimal threshold strategy (see Assumption 2.1).
The following is a standing assumption in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Assumption 2.1. We make the following assumptions in this section:
(a) We will assume that the set of admissible strategies is limited to threshold strategies. These
strategies are determined by specifying two numbers a ∈ (c, d) and b ∈ (c, d) as follows: At
the time the uncontrolled process hits level b, the controller decides to reduce the level of the
process from ξTi− = b to a < b, through an intervention, and save the continuously incurred
cost (which is high if the process is at a high level). But the implementation of this decision
is subject to a delay of ∆ units of time. Note that ξ(Ti+∆)− might be less than a. In that case
the impulse applied increases the value of the process. Otherwise, if the value of the process
is greater than a at time (Ti +∆)− then the intervention reduces the level of the process to
a.
(b) The running cost function f : (c, d)→ R is a continuous functions that satisfies
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs | f (Xs)|ds
]
<∞. (2.7)
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(c) For any point x ∈ (c, d), we assume
K (x, x) < 0. (2.8)
We make this assumption to account for the fixed cost of making an intervention.
2.1. Characterization of the value function
In this section, we will show that when we apply a suitable transformation to the value
function corresponding to a particular threshold strategy (that is identified by a pair (a, b)), the
transformed value function is linear on (0, F(b)). This characterization will become important
in determining the optimal threshold strategy in the next section.
Let us define
g(x) , Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (X0s )ds
]
. (2.9)
The following identity, which can be derived using the Strong Markov Property of X0, will come
in handy in a couple of computations below:
Ex
[∫ τ
0
e−αs f (X0s )ds
]
= g(x)− Ex [e−ατ g(X0τ )], (2.10)
for any stopping time τ under the assumption (2.7).
Now, let us simplify J ν by splitting the terms in (2.5). We can write the first terms (the term with
the integral) as
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (Xs)ds
]
= Ex
[∫ T1+∆
0
e−αs f (X0s )ds
+ e−α(T1+∆)EXT1+∆
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (Xs)ds
]]
= g(x)− Ex [e−α(T1+∆)g(X0T1+∆)]
+Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)EXT1+∆
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (Xs)ds
]]
= g(x)− Ex [e−α(T1+∆)g(X(T1+∆)−)]
+Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)EXT1+∆
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (Xs)ds
]]
, (2.11)
while the second term can be developed as
Ex
[ ∑
Ti<∞
e−α(Ti+∆)K (X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆)
]
= Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)K (X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆)+ e−α(T1+∆)
∞∑
i=2
e−α((Ti+∆)−(T1+∆))K (X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]
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= Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)K (X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆)+ e−α(T1+∆)
Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α((Ti+∆)◦θ(T1+∆))K (X(Ti+1+∆)−, XTi+1+∆)
∣∣∣∣∣FT1+∆
]]
= Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)
{
K (X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆)+ EXT1+∆[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)K (X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]}]
where we used Ti+1 +∆ = (T1 +∆)+ (Ti +∆) ◦ θ(T1 +∆) with the shift operator θ(·) in the
second equality. Here, we relied on Remark 2.1. Combining the two terms, we can write (2.5) as
J ν(x) = Ex [e−α(T1+∆){K (X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)− g(X(T1+∆)−)+ J ν(XT1+∆)}] + g(x).
We define
u , J ν − g. (2.12)
By adding and subtracting g(X(T1+∆)) to and from the first term we obtain
u(x) = Ex [e−α(T1+∆) K¯ (X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆)+ u(XT1+∆)] (2.13)
in which
K¯ (x, y) , K (x, y)− g(x)+ g(y). (2.14)
since T1− = τb with τb = inf{t ≥ 0 : X0t ≥ b} and the post intervention point is given by
XT1+∆ = Xτb+∆ = X(τb+∆)− − ξ1 , a. (2.15)
From Remark 2.1
u(x) = Ex [e−α(τb+∆){K¯ (Xτb+∆, a)+ u(a)}]
= Ex [Ex [e−α(τb+∆){K¯ (Xτb+∆, a)+ u(a)}|Fτb ]]
= Ex [e−ατbEXτb [e−α∆{K¯ (X∆, a)+ u(a)}]]. (2.16)
Evaluating at x = b, we obtain u(b) = Eb[e−α∆{K¯ (X∆, a) + u(a)}]. Therefore, (2.13)
becomes
u(x) = Ex [e−ατbu(Xτb )].
Hence we have finally
u(x) =
{
u0(x) , Ex [e−ατbu(b)], x ∈ (c, b),
Ex [e−α∆(K¯ (X∆, a)+ u0(a))], x ∈ [b, d), (2.17)
where the second equality is obtained when we plug T1 = 0 in (2.13).
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Using appropriate boundary conditions one can solve (A− α)u = 0 and obtain
Ex [e−ατr 1{τr<τl }] =
ψ(l)ϕ(x)− ψ(x)ϕ(l)
ψ(l)ϕ(r)− ψ(r)ϕ(l) ,
Ex [e−ατr 1{τl<τr }] =
ψ(x)ϕ(r)− ψ(r)ϕ(x)
ψ(l)ϕ(r)− ψ(r)ϕ(l) ,
(2.18)
for x ∈ [l, r ] where τl , inf{t > 0; X0t = l} and τr , inf{t > 0; X0t = r} (see e.g. Dayanik and
Karatzas [12]). By defining
W , (u/ϕ) ◦ F−1, (2.19)
Eq. (2.17) becomes
W (F(x)) = W (F(c)) F(b)− F(x)
F(b)− F(c) +W (F(b))
F(x)− F(c)
F(b)− F(c) , x ∈ (c, b], (2.20)
We should note that F(c) , F(c+) = ψ(c+)/ϕ(c+) = 0 and
W (F(c)) = lc , lim sup
x↓c
K¯ (x, a)+
ϕ(x)
(2.21)
for any a ∈ (c, d). For more detailed mathematical meaning of this value lc, we refer the reader
to Dayanik and Karatzas [12]. We have now established that W (F(x)) is a linear function in the
transformed “continuation region”.
2.2. An algorithm to compute the value function
Let us denote
r(x; a) , Ex [e−α∆ K¯ (X∆, a)] (2.22)
and transform this function by
R(·; a) , r(F
−1(·), a)
ϕ(F−1(·)) . (2.23)
First stage: For a given pair (a, b) ∈ (c, d) × (c, d) we can determine (2.17) from the linear
characterization (2.20). On (0, F(b)] we will find W (y) = ρy + lc (in which the slope is to be
determined) from
ρF(b)+ lc = R(F(b), a)+ e−α∆(ρF(a)+ lc)ϕ(a)
ϕ(b)
. (2.24)
ρ can be determined as
ρ =
R(F(b; a))+ lc
(
e−α∆ ϕ(a)
ϕ(b) − 1
)
F(b)− e−α∆ ϕ(a)
ϕ(b) F(a)
. (2.25)
Sometimes we will refer to ρ as b → ρ(b), when it becomes necessary to emphasize the
dependence on b. The function u can be written as
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u(x) =
{
u0(x) , ρψ(x)+ lcϕ(x) x ≤ b
r(x, a)+ e−α∆u0(a) x > b. (2.26)
Note that (A − α)u(x) = 0 for x < b. Henceforth, to emphasize the dependence on the pair
(a, b) we will write ua,b(·) for the function u(·).
Second stage: Our purpose in this section is to determine
ua(x) , sup
b∈(c,d)
ua,b(x), x ∈ (c, d), (2.27)
and to determine the constant b∗
ua(x) = ua,b∗(x), x ∈ (c, d), (2.28)
if it exists.
Let us fix a and treat ρ as a function of b parametrized by a.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that the function R(·; a) defined in (2.23) is differentiable and that there
exists a constant b∗ ∈ (c, d) satisfying (2.28). Then b∗ satisfies the equation
ρF ′(b) = ∂
∂y
R(y; a)
∣∣∣∣
y=F(b)
F ′(b)− e−α∆(ρF(a)+ lc)ϕ(a)ϕ
′(b)
ϕ(b)2
. (2.29)
in which ρ is given by (2.25).
Proof. From (2.26) it follows that the maximums of the functions b → ua,b and b → ρ(b) are
attained at the same point. Now taking the derivative of (2.24) and evaluating at ρb = 0 we obtain
(2.29). 
To find the optimal b (given a) we solve the non-linear and implicit equation (2.29). Under
certain assumptions on the function (r/ϕ) ◦ F−1, this equation has a unique solution as we show
below.
Remark 2.2. On y ≥ F(b), the function W is given by
W (y) = e−α∆(ρF(a)+ lc) ϕ(a)
ϕ(F−1(y))
+ R(y; a). (2.30)
The right derivative of W at F(b) is given by
W ′(F(b)) = −e−α∆(ρF(a)+ lc) ϕ(a)
ϕ(b)2
ϕ′(b)
F ′(b)
+ ∂
∂y
R(y; a)
∣∣∣∣
y=F(b)
. (2.31)
Therefore, (2.29) implies that the left and the right derivative of W (recall that W (y) = ρy + lc
for y < F(b)) at F(b) are equal (smooth fit).
Let us define
ua(x) , sup
b∈(c,d)
Ex [e−ατbEXτb [e−α∆{K¯ (X∆, a)+ ua(a)}]]. (2.32)
The next lemma shows that (2.32) is well-defined. Below we show that under certain assumptions
on (r/ϕ) ◦ F−1 this function is equal to ua .
Lemma 2.2. Assume that
sup
x∈(c,d)
Ex [K¯ (X∆, a)] > 0 (2.33)
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for some a ∈ (c, d). Let us introduce a family of value functions parameterized by γ ∈ R as
V γa (x) , sup
τ∈S
Ex
[
e−α(τ+∆)
{
K¯ (X0τ+∆, a)+ γ
}]
= sup
τ∈S
Ex
[
e−ατEX0τ
[
e−α∆
{
K¯ (X0∆, a)+ γ
}]]
, (2.34)
here S is the set of all stopping times of the natural filtration of X0. Then there exists a unique
γ ∗ such that V γ
∗
a (a) = γ ∗.
Proof. Let us denote
W γa (F(x)) ,
V γa (x)
ϕ(x)
. (2.35)
Consider the function γ → V γa (a). Our aim is to show that there exists a fixed point to this
function. Let us consider V 0a (a) first. Because (2.33) is satisfied we have that V
0
a (a) > 0. As
γ increases, V γ (a) increases monotonically, by the right hand side of (2.34). Now, Lemma A.1
implies that for γ1 > γ2 ≥ 0,
V γ1a (x)− V γ2a (x) ≤ γ1 − γ2 (2.36)
for any x ∈ R+. Note that W γa (F(a)) ≥ R(F(a), a) + e−α∆γϕ(a) for all γ . However, since V has
less than linear growth in γ as demonstrated by (2.36) we can see that there is a certain γ ′ large
enough such that W γa (F(a)) = R(F(a), a)+ e−α∆γϕ(a) for γ ≥ γ ′. This implies however
ϕ(a)W γ
′
a (F(a)) = ϕ(a)R(F(a), a)+ e−α∆γ ′
⇔ V γ ′a (a) = r(a, a)+ e−α∆γ ′ < γ ′
where the inequality is due to the assumption (2.8). For this γ ′, we have V γ
′
a (a) < γ ′.
Since γ → V γa is continuous, which follows from the fact that this function is convex, and
increasing, V 0a > 0 and V
γ ′
a (a) < γ ′ implies that γ → V γa crosses the line γ → γ . 
Lemma 2.3. Assume that
r(x, a) is lower semi-continuous. (2.37)
Let us define Rγ (·; a) , rγ (F−1(·),a)
ϕ(F−1(·)) where
rγ (x, a) , Ex [e−α∆(K¯ (X∆, a)+ γ )]. (2.38)
Then (2.35) is the smallest non-negative concave majorant of Rγ that passes through
(F(c+), lc).
Proof. See for e.g. Dynkin [14] and Dayanik and Karatzas [12]. 
Lemma 2.4. Assume that (2.33) and (2.37) hold. Then ua/ϕ is F-concave, i.e., α-excessive.1
1 A function f is called α-excessive function of X0 if for any stopping time τ of the natural filtration of X0 and
x ∈ (c, d), f (x) ≥ Ex [e−ατ f (X0τ )], see for e.g. Borodin and Salminen [10] and Dynkin [14] for more details.
342 E. Bayraktar, M. Egami / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 117 (2007) 333–358
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3. For the equivalence of α-excessivity and
F-concavity see e.g. Theorem 12.4 in Dynkin [14] and also Dayanik and Karatzas [12]. This
fact can be observed from (A.8). 
Lemma 2.5. Assume that (2.33) and (2.37) hold. Then
ua(x) ≤ ua(x), x ∈ (c, d). (2.39)
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.4 that ua is α-excessive. Also, observe from (2.32) that
ua(x) ≥ r(x; a)+ e−α∆ua(a), (2.40)
where r(x, a) is as in (2.37). Let ν = {T1, T2, . . . , Ti , . . . ; ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξi , . . .} be an admissible
control and let T0 = 0. Without loss of generality we will assume that r(b; a) > 0, because
otherwise the corresponding strategy will have a lower value function J ν(x) associated to it.
Since ua is α-excessive,
ua(x) ≥ Ex [e−αT1ua(XT1)], and
Ex [e−α(Ti+∆)ua(X(Ti+∆))] − Ex [e−αTi+1ua(XTi+1)] ≥ 0, (2.41)
for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1. Then
ua(x) ≥ Ex [e−αT1ua(XT1)] +
N−1∑
i=1
Ex [e−αTi+1ua(XTi+1)] − Ex [e−α(Ti+∆)ua(X(Ti+∆))]
= Ex [e−αTN ua(XTN )] +
N−1∑
i=1
Ex [e−αTi ua(XTi )] − Ex [e−α(Ti+∆)ua(X(Ti+∆))]
≥
N−1∑
i=1
Ex [e−αTi r(XTi , a)], (2.42)
in which the inequality follows from (2.40) and the fact that ua is non-negative. Now, using the
monotone convergence theorem
ua(x) ≥ Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−αTi r(XTi , a)
]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)EXTi
[
K¯ (X∆, a)
]]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)EXTi [K (X∆, a)− g(X∆)+ g(a)]
]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)K (X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]
+Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)(−g(X(Ti+∆)−)+ g(X(Ti+∆)))
]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)K (X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]
+Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs f (Xs)ds
]
− g(x) = ua,b(x). (2.43)
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The third inequality follows from Remark 2.1. The fourth inequality can be derived from (2.11).
The last equality follows from (2.12). Now taking the supremum over b, we obtain (2.39). 
Lemma 2.6. Assume that (2.33) and (2.37) hold and that the function x → R(x; a) defined in
(2.22) is concave and increasing on (a′, d) for some a′ ∈ (a, d) and that
lim
x→F(d) R(x; a) = ∞. (2.44)
Then ua(x) = ua,b∗(x) for a unique b∗ ∈ (c, d). Hence from Lemma 2.5 it follows that
ua(x) = ua(x) = ua,b∗(x), x ∈ (c, d).
Proof. Since R is concave, Rγ in (2.38) is also concave on (a′, d). The assumption in (2.44)
implies that the smallest concave majorant W γa in (2.35) is linear on (F(c), F(bγ )) for a
unique bγ ∈ (c, d) and is tangential to Rγ (·, a) at F(bγ ) and coincides with Rγ (·, a) on
[F(bγ ), F(d)). Together with Lemma 2.2 this implies that there exists a unique γ ∗ such that
Eqs. (2.30) and (2.31) are satisfied when W is replaced by W γ
∗
a and b is replaced by bγ
∗
. Note
that W γ
∗
a corresponds to a strategy (a, bγ
∗
). That is, if we start with ua,b
γ ∗
and transform it via
(2.19) we get W γ
∗
a . On the other hand, using (2.35) and by substituting γ = γ ∗ we have that
ua(x) = ϕ(x)W γ
∗
a (F(x)), x ∈ (c, d). This lets us conclude that ua,bγ
∗ = ua(x), x ∈ (c, d). We
see that the unique b∗ in the claim of the proposition is bγ ∗ . 
Proposition 2.7. Assume that the hypotheses of Lemma 2.6 are satisfied. Then there exists a
unique solution to (2.29). If b∗ is the unique solution of (2.29), then ua(x) = ua,b∗(x).
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 2.6, we have seen that there exists a unique b∗ such that (2.30) and
(2.31) are satisfied. Using Remark 2.2, we conclude that b∗ is the unique solution of (2.29). 
Note that when the assumptions of Proposition 2.7 hold, the optimal threshold strategy is
described by a single open interval in the state space of the controlled process. The conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of the optimal interval are specified, essentially by the conditions
on total reward function K¯ (x, y) associated with one intervention from x to y (see (2.14) and
(2.23)) and drift and volatility of the underlying diffusion as the function F that appears in (2.23)
depends on them.
Third stage: Now, we let a ∈ (c, d) vary and choose a∗ that maximizes ρ(a) and also find
b∗ = b(a∗). Finally, we obtain the value function given in (2.6) by v(x) = u(x)+ g(x).
2.3. Example: Optimal exchange rate intervention when there is delay
To illustrate the procedure of solving impulse control problems with delay, we take an example
from Mundaca and Øksendal [18] (also see Øksendal [19]) that considers the following foreign
exchange rate intervention problem:
J νD(x) , Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsX2s ds +
∞∑
i
e−α(Ti+∆)(c + λ|ξi |)
]
(2.45)
where X0t = x + Bt , in which B is a standard Brownian motion. Here, the superscript 0
is to indicate that the dynamics in consideration are of the uncontrolled state variable. In
(2.45), c > 0 and λ ≥ 0 are constants representing the cost of making an intervention. The
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problem without delays are solved by Øksendal [19] through quasi-variational inequalities and
by Dayanik and Egami [11] using a direct characterization of the value function. In this problem,
the Brownian motion represents the exchange rate of currency and the impulse control represents
the interventions the central bank makes in order to keep the exchange rate in a given target
window. At time Ti , such that XTi− = b, the central bank makes a commitment to reduce the
exchange rate from b to a < b, which is implemented ∆ units of time later. During the time
interval (Ti , Ti + ∆] the central bank does not make any other interventions. ∆ units later if
the exchange rate is still greater than a, then the central bank reduces the exchange rate from
X(Ti+∆)− to a and pays a cost of c + λ(X(Ti+∆)− − a). On the other hand, if ∆ units of time
later the exchange rate is less than a, the central bank chooses to increase the exchange rate to a
at a cost of c + λ(a − X(Ti+∆)−). This is a one-sided impulse control problem, in the sense that
a control is triggered only if X t > b and there has not been any previous action in the interval
(t −∆, t).
The problem is to minimize the expected total discounted cost over all threshold strategies.
vD(x) , inf
ν
J νD(x). (2.46)
A similar version of this problem is analyzed by Øksendal and Sulem [22], in which they take
the controls ξi ∈ FTi for all i . (This introduces path dependence since the value of XTi+∆ is
partially determined by FTi .)
Instead of solving a minimization problem of (2.46), we will solve
v(x) = sup
ν
Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs(−X2s )ds −
∞∑
i
e−α(Ti+∆)(c + λ|ξi |)
]
and recover the value function by vD(x) = −v(x). (Here, the supremum is taken over all
the threshold strategies.) The continuous cost rate is f (x) = −x2 and the intervention cost
is K (x, y) = −c − λ|x − y| in our terminology. By solving the equation (A − α)v(x) =
1
2v
′′
(x) − αv(x) = 0, we find that ψ(x) = ex
√
2α and ϕ(x) = e−x
√
2α . Hence F(x) = e2x
√
2α
and F−1(x) = log x
2
√
2α
. Using Fubini’s theorem we can calculate g(x) explicitly as:
g(x) = −Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αs(x + Bs)2ds = −
(
x2
α
+ 1
α2
)
.
We shall follow the procedure described in the last section: Let us fix a > 0 and consider
r(x, a) = Ex [e−α∆ K¯ (X∆, a)] = Ex [e−α∆(−c − λ|X∆ − a| + g(a)− g(X∆))]
= Ex
[
e−α∆
(
−c − λ|x + B∆ − a| −
(
a2
α
+ 1
α2
)
+
(
(x + B∆)2
α
+ 1
α2
))]
= e−α∆
(
−c − λ
(
2∆ exp
(
− (a − x)
2
4∆2
)
+ (a − x)
(
−1+ 2N
(
a − x
∆
)))
+ x
2 − a2 +∆
α
)
. (2.47)
The left boundary −∞ is natural for a Brownian motion and, for any a > 0,
l−∞ = lim sup
x↓−∞
r(x, a)+
ϕ(x)
= 0.
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It follows that R(y) passes through (F(−∞), l−∞) = (0, 0). (See Dayanik and Karatzas [12]
Proposition 5.12.)
Proposition 2.8. For the function r in (2.47), there exists a unique solution to (2.29) for a fixed a.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Using the algorithm we described in Section 2.2 we find the optimal (a∗, b∗, ρ∗). Going back
to the original space we get
V (x) = sup
a,b∈R
u(x) = ϕ(x)W ∗(F(x)) = ϕ(x)(β∗)F(x) = ρ∗ex
√
2α.
on x ∈ (−∞, b∗]. To get v(x) = supν J ν(x), we add back g(x),
v(x) = V (x)+ g(x) = ρ∗ex
√
2α −
(
x2
α
+ 1
α2
)
.
Finally, flipping the sign we obtain the optimal cost function as
vD(x) =

vˆo(x) ,
(
x2
α
+ 1
α2
)
− ρ∗ex
√
2α, 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗,
−e−α∆ρ∗ea∗
√
2α − r(x; a∗)+ x
2
α
+ 1
α2
, b∗ ≤ x .
(2.48)
Fig. 1 is obtained when the parameters are chosen to be (c, λ, α,∆) = (150, 50, 0.2, 1.0).
We found the solution triplet to be (a∗, b∗, ρ∗) = (5.066, 12.1756, 0.042423). The optimal
cost function without delay, for the same parameters, has the solution triplet (a0, b0, ρ0) =
(5.07723, 12.2611, 0.0492262). The continuation region shifts to the left with delay (it shrinks
from (−∞, 12.2611) to (−∞, 12.1756)), and the central bank acts more aggressively when it
encounters delays (see Fig. 1(c)).
3. Firing costs and labor demand: Optimal band strategies
In this section, we will improve on the techniques of the previous section in order to study
an impulse control corresponding to band policies when there are implementation delays. In
particular, we will concentrate our attention on a specific example, which is of practical interest.
We will find optimal hiring and firing decisions of a firm that faces stochastic demand and has to
conform to regulatory delays when it is firing employees.
Recently, General Motors Corporation (GM) has decided to lay off 25,000 of its work force
to cut back on its production and administrative costs. However “GM’s UAW (United Auto
Workers) contract essentially forces it to pay union employees during the life of the contract even
if hourly workers are laid off and their plants are closed. But those protections only run through
September 2007, when the current four-year pact with the union ends. GM spokesman Ed Snyder
said the automaker has yet to reach any agreement with the UAW on the nature or the manner of
the work force reduction”.2 This is a typical example of a firing cost and implementation delay a
corporation faces when the workers are unionized. Another example of firing delay is caused by
government regulations in Europe (see e.g. Bentolila and Bertola [9]).
2 Source: June 7, 2005 CNN Money, “GM to cut 25,000 jobs” by Chris Isidore,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/07/news/fortune500/gm closings/.
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Fig. 1. (a) The optimal cost function vD(x). The dotted line and the solid line fit each other continuously at b∗ =
12.1756. (b) The derivative of vD(x), showing that the smooth-fit principle holds at b∗. (c) Comparison of vD(x) with
the cost function without delay v0(x). Note that vD majorizes v0. (d) Plot of the difference of vD(x)− v0(x).
Bentolila and Bertola [9] address the issue of costly hiring and firing and its effects on
unemployment rate in Europe using singular stochastic control. Here, we solve an impulse
control problem since we are also taking fixed cost of labor adjustments into account. But our
main purpose is to measure the effects on firing delay in the decisions of firms. As we shall
see, it turns out that the controlled state variable is not Markov, therefore we will focus our
attention completely on band policies (which we will define shortly) rather than trying to find
the best impulse control policy. Our method of solving impulse control problem differs from its
counterparts that use quasi-variational inequalities since we give a direct characterization of the
value function as a linear function in the continuation region without having to guess the form of
the solution and without having to prove that the conjectured solution satisfies the conditions of
a verification lemma.
3.1. Problem setup
As in Bentolila and Bertola [9],3 we will consider a firm with a linear production technology.
In particular the quantity sold is Qt = AL t , A ∈ R+, in which L t is the labor at time t . The
selling price at time t , Pt , of the product is determined from
Qt = Z t P
1
µ−1
t , µ ∈ (0, 1) (3.1)
3 The set up of Bentolila and Bertola [9] was brought to our attention by Keppo and Maull. In the INFORMS Annual
Meeting in 2004, Keppo and Maull presented their partial results on the hiring and firing decisions of firms which they
obtained by solving quasi-variational inequalities.
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in which Z t indexes the position of the direct demand curve whose dynamics follow
dZ t = Z tbdt + Z tσtdWt (3.2)
with a constant b ∈ R+. In Eq. (3.1) the quantity 1 − µ is the firm’s monopoly power. Let us
denote the filtration generated by the demand process Z by F , (Ft )t≥0. We will make the
following assumption to guarantee that (3.2) has a unique strong solution. We assume that σ is
bounded and adapted to the filtration of the Brownian motion W .
In our framework, if the firm produces excess products because of excess labor, the products
produced are still all sold but at a cheaper price. The firm pays a wage,w, to its workers, therefore
the net rate of profit that the firm makes at time t is given by
Qt Pt − wL t = Z1−µt (AL t )µ − wL t .
When the workers quit voluntarily, the firm bears no firing costs and we assume that the workers
quit at rate δ, that is, without any intervention from the management the labor force follows the
dynamics
dL0t = −δL0t dt. (3.3)
Here, as in the previous section, the superscript 0 indicates that there are no controls applied. The
firm makes commitments to change its labor force at times {Si }i∈N and {Ti }i∈N. At time Si the
firm makes a commitment to increase its labor force (which is immediately implemented), and
at time Ti it makes a commitment to decrease its labor force, which is implemented ∆ units of
time later. During the time interval (Ti , Ti + ∆] the firm makes no commitments to change its
labor force. Note that although at time Ti the firm decided to decrease its labor force, the labor
force itself might move to very low levels following the dynamics (3.3), therefore at time Ti +∆
the firm may end up hiring to move to keep the production level up. However, if the labor force
level is still very high at time (Ti + ∆)−, then the firm ends up firing. Here, ∆ represents the
regulatory delays a firm faces when it is cutting off its work force.
The labor adjustments come at a cost: At time Si the firm increases the labor by ζi (≥0) ∈ FSi
(Here, for the sake of brevity we are taking the σ -algebras as a collection of mappings.) to
L Si− + ζi , then the associated cost is
c1ζi + c2L Si−.
At time Ti , the firm makes a commitment to decrease the labor at time Ti + ∆. If it ends up
decreasing the labor force by ηi (≥0) ∈ FTi+∆ to LTi+∆ = L(Ti+∆)− − ηi , then the associated
cost is quantified as
c3ηi + c4L(Ti+∆)−,
which depends on the amount of labor force to be fired and the level of the total labor force as
well. The latter component of costs is based on the following observations: When a corporation
decides who to fire or which division to restructure, administrative costs will become larger in
proportion to the size of the total labor force since the firm’s operations are closely knitted among
various divisions.
On the other hand, as we discussed above, if the labor force itself moves to very low levels
itself during the ∆ units of time, at time Ti +∆ the firm may end up hiring (in this case ηi ≤ 0)
to keep the production up at the cost of
c1|ηi | + c2L(Ti+∆)−
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for some positive constants c1, c2, c3, c4 and∆ ≥ 0. This cost becomes negligible as∆ becomes
small because in that case the work force does not change much by itself. So the controls of the
firm are of the form
ν = (S1, S2, . . . ; ζ1, ζ2, . . . ; T1, T2, . . . ; η1, η2, . . .),
where 0 ≤ S1 < S2 < · · · and 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < · · · are two increasing sequences of stopping
times of the filtrationF . Ti+1−Ti ≥ ∆ and for any i there exists no j such that Ti ≤ S j ≤ Ti+∆.
The magnitudes of the impulses satisfy ζi (≥0) ∈ FSi and ηi (∈ R) ∈ FTi+∆ for all i . We call
these type of controls admissible and we will denote the set of all admissible controls by V . To
each control ν ∈ A we associate a profit function of the form
J ν(z, l) , E
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t (Z1−µt (AL t )µ − wL t )dt −
∑
i
e−r Si (c1ζi + c2L Si−)
−
∑
j
e−r(T j+∆)((c3η j + c4L(T j+∆)−)1{η j>0}
+ (c1η j + c2L(T j+∆)−)1{η j<0})
]
, (3.4)
which incorporates the profit and cost structure we have described so far. Here r > b is a
subjective rate of return that the firm uses to discount its future profits. In fact if r < b, then
taking no action is optimal as we will point out below. Under the measure P, we have that L0 = l
and Z0 = z almost surely.
The objective of the company is then to maximize its profits by choosing the best possible
strategy ν∗ such that
v(z, l) , sup
v∈V
J ν(z, l) = J ν∗(z, l), (3.5)
if the optimal strategy ν∗ exists. Hereafter, we will refer to v as the value function.
It looks as if the control problem defined in (3.5) involves two state variables, namely the
demand Z and the labor force L . Recall that we have no control over the demand Z but we can
control the labor force L by making hires and fires. But the only source of randomness is the
demand process. In the sequel we will show that the optimal control problem (3.5) involves only
one state variable. On denoting ξt , L t/Z t , t ≥ 0 and the absolute changes in labor per unit of
demand by βi , ζi/ZSi and αi , ηi/ZTi+∆ ∈ FTi+∆, we can write the the profit function J ν as
J ν(z, l) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−r t Z t ((Aξt )µ − wξt )dt −
∑
i
e−r Si ZSi−(c1βi + c2ξSi−)∑
j
e−r(T j+∆)((c3ZT j α j + c4ZT j+∆ ξ(T j+∆)−)1{α j>0}
+ (c1ZT j α j + c2ZT j+∆ ξ(T j+∆)−)1{α j<0})
]
. (3.6)
Let us introduce a new probability measure P0 by
dP0
dP
∣∣∣∣Ft = Z˜ t , where Z˜ t = exp
(∫ t
0
σsdWs − 12
∫ t
0
σ 2s ds
)
(3.7)
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for every 0 ≤ t <∞. Using the representation of the profit function J ν , we can write it as
J ν(z, l) = z I ν
( z
l
)
, (3.8)
in which
I ν(ξ) , Eξ0
[∫ ∞
0
e(b−r)t z
(
(Aξt )µ − wξt
)
dt −
∑
i
e(b−r)Si (c1βi + c2ξSi−)
−
∑
j
e(b−r)(T j+∆)((c3α j + c4ξ(T j+∆)−)1{α j>0}
+ (c1α j + c2ξ(T j+∆)−)1{α j<0})
]
, (3.9)
where Eξ is the expectation under P0 given that ξ0 = ξ . Here, with a slight abuse of notation, on
the right-hand-side of (3.8), we denoted
ν = (S1, S2, . . . ;β1, β2, . . . ; T1, T2, . . . ;α1, α2, . . .),
which is a control that is applied to the process ξ . The controls here are such that βi (≥0) ∈ FSi
and αi (∈R) ∈ FTi+∆. Again as before {Sn}n∈N and {Tn}n∈N are two increasing sequences of
stopping times. We also assume that Ti+1 − Ti ≥ ∆ ≥ 0 and that for any i there exists no j such
that Ti ≤ S j ≤ Ti+∆. With another slight abuse of notation we will denote the admissible set
of controls we described here also by V . As a result of the developments in the last part of this
section we see that the process L t/Z t is the sufficient statistic of the problem in (3.5). In fact we
can write the value function as
v(z, l) = zY
( z
l
)
, where Y (ξ) , sup
ν∈V
I ν(ξ). (3.10)
Under the measure Pξ0 the dynamics of the process, ξt when there are no impulses applied follows
ξ0t = ξ exp
(
−(b + δ)t −
∫ t
0
σsdBs − 12
∫ t
0
σ 2s ds
)
, (3.11)
where B is a Wiener process under measure P0. Here, as before, the superscript 0 indicates that
there are no controls/impulses applied.
3.2. Solution
The controlled process ξ is not a Markov process, because depending on whether the process
reaches a point during the interval (Ti , Ti +∆) or not, that point has different roles. That is, how
the process reaches a particular point (path information) affects how the process will continue
from that point. However, the process regenerates at times {Ti + ∆}i∈N and the value of the
process at time T ∈ (Ti , Ti+∆), XT , depends on the information up to Ti , FTi , only through the
value of the process at time Ti , XTi . Therefore, as we did in Section 2.1, assuming there is no
history prior to time 0, i.e. F0 is a trivial sigma-algebra, we can develop
I ν(ξ) = Eξ0
[
1{T1<S1}e(b−r)(T1+∆)
(
C1(ξ(T1+∆)−, ξT1+∆)− g(ξ(T1+∆)−)+ I ν(ξT1+∆)
)
+ 1{T1>S1}e(b−r)S1
(
C2(ξS1−, ξS1)− g(ξS1−)+ I ν(ξS1)
)]
, (3.12)
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where
C2(x, y) , −c1(y − x)1{y>x} − c2x, and,
C1(x, y) , −(c3(x − y)+ c4x)1{x>y} + C2(x, y)1{y>x} (3.13)
g(ξ) , E0
[∫ ∞
0
e(b−r)t
(
(Aξ0t )
µ − wξ0t
)
dt
]
. (3.14)
On denoting u(ξ) , I ν˜(ξ)− g(ξ), we can write
u(ξ) = Eξ0[1{T1<S1}e(b−r)(T1+∆)(C¯1(ξ(T1+∆)−, ξT1+∆)+ u(ξT1+∆))]
+Eξ0[1{T1>S1}e(b−r)S1(C¯2(ξS1−, ξS1)+ u(ξS1))], (3.15)
in which
C¯1(x, y) , C1(x, y)− g(x)+ g(y) and C¯2(x, y) , C2(x, y)− g(x)+ g(y). (3.16)
In the rest of this section, we will analyze the following double sided threshold strategy (band
policy) of the following form: (1) Whenever the marginal revenue product of labor hits level d,
the firm makes a commitment to bring the marginal revenue product of labor to c < d. This
may be achieved by firing employees if the marginal revenue product of labor is still greater than
c after the delay. However, it is possible that after the delay the marginal revenue product of
labor will be less than c. In this case, the firm makes hires. (2) Whenever the marginal revenue
product of labor hits level p the firm increases it to q > p (by hiring new employees). We will
characterize the value function corresponding to an arbitrary band policy.
For the band policy we described above S1 = τp and T1 = τd , and
ξT1+∆ = ξ(τb+∆)− − α1 = c and ξS1 = ξS1− + β1 = q.
Here, for any x ∈ R+, τx , inf{t ≥ 0 : ξ0t = x}. Let us introduce
u0(ξ) , Eξ0[e(b−r)τd1{τd<τp}u(d)] + Eξ0[e(b−r)τp1{τd>τp}u(p)], (3.17)
in which
u(d) = Ed0
[
e(b−r)∆(C¯1(ξ0∆−, c)+ u(c))
]
and u(p) = C¯2(p, q)+ u(q). (3.18)
From (3.15), (3.16) and (3.18) it can be seen that
u(ξ) =

C¯2(ξ, q)+ u0(q), ξ ≤ p;
u0(ξ), p ≤ ξ ≤ d;
r(ξ, c)+ e(b−r)∆u0(c), ξ ≥ d.
(3.19)
in which
r(ξ, c) , Eξ0[e(b−r)∆C¯1(ξ0∆−, c)]. (3.20)
Let us denote the fundamental solutions of (A + (b − r)) f = 0, by ψ (increasing) and ϕ
(decreasing), and introduce F , ψ/ϕ. Using (2.18), on the interval (p, d) we can write u as
u(ξ)
ϕ(ξ)
= u(d)
ϕ(d)
(F(ξ)− F(p))
(F(d)− F(p)) +
u(p)
ϕ(p)
(F(d)− F(ξ))
(F(d)− F(p)) , ξ ∈ (p, d). (3.21)
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Then, W , u
ϕ
◦ F−1, satisfies
W (y) = W (F(d)) y − F(p)
F(d)− F(p) +W (F(p))
(F(d)− y)
(F(d)− F(p)) , y ∈ [F(p), F(d)].
(3.22)
Using the linear characterization (in the continuation region) of the band policies in (3.22), the
following algorithm first determines the function u for an arbitrary band policy and goes on to
find the best band policy.
First, let us define
R1(x; c) , r(·, c)
ϕ(·) ◦ F
−1(x) and R2(x; q) , C¯2(·, q)
ϕ(·) ◦ F
−1(x). (3.23)
Algorithm. 1. For a given band policy which is characterized by the quadruplet (p, q, c, d)
such that p < q < c < d , we can find the value function u in (3.19) using the linear
characterization in (3.22). On [F(p), F(d)] we will find W (y) = ρy + τ (in which the slope
ρ and the intercept τ are to be determined) from
e(b−r)∆(ρF(c)+ τ) ϕ(c)
ϕ(d)
+ R1(F(d); c) = ρF(d)+ τ,
(ρF(q)+ τ) ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)
+ R2(F(p); q) = ρF(p)+ τ.
(3.24)
ρ and τ are determined as
ρ =
R2(F(p);q)
1−ϕ(q)/ϕ(p)
(
e(b−r)∆ ϕ(c)
ϕ(d) − 1
)
+ R1(F(d); c)
F(d)− e(b−r)∆ ϕ(c)
ϕ(d) F(c)+ ϕ(q)/ϕ(p)F(q)−F(p)1−ϕ(q)/ϕ(p)
(
1− e(b−r)∆ ϕ(c)
ϕ(d)
) ,
τ =
ρ
(
ϕ(q)
ϕ(p) F(q)− F(p)
)
+ R2(F(p; q))
1− ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)
.
(3.25)
Now u can be written as
u(ξ) =

u0(q)+ r2(ξ, q), x ≤ p,
u0(ξ) , ρψ(ξ)+ τϕ(ξ), p ≤ x ≤ d,
e(b−r)∆u0(c)+ r1(ξ, c), x ≥ d.
(3.26)
From this last expression, we observe that (A+ (b − r))u(ξ) = 0 for ξ ∈ (p, d).
2. Note that ρ and τ are functions of (p, d) parametrized by (q, c). We will find an optimal pair
(p, d) given (q, c) by equating the gradient of the function (ρ, τ ) with respect to (p, d) to be
zero. Now, differentiating the first equation in (3.24) with respect to d, and the second with
respect to p, and evaluating them at τd = ρd = τp = ρp = 0 we obtain
−(ρF(q)+ τ) ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)2
ϕ′(p)− ρF ′(p)+ ∂
∂y
R2(y; q)
∣∣∣∣
y=F(p)
F ′(p) = 0
−e(b−r)∆(ρF(c)+ τ) ϕ(c)
ϕ(d)2
ϕ′(d)− ρF ′(d)+ ∂
∂y
R1(y; c)
∣∣∣∣
y=F(d)
F ′(d) = 0, (3.27)
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in which ρ and τ are given by (3.25). To find the optimal (p, d) (given (c, q)) we solve the
non-linear and implicit system of equations in (3.27).
Remark 3.1. On [F(0), F(p)] the function W is given by
W (x) =
(
(ρF(q)+ τ) ϕ(q)
ϕ(F−1(x))
)
+ R2(x; q), (3.28)
and its left derivative at F(p), W ′(F(p)−), is given by
W ′(F(p)−) = −(ρF(q)+ τ) ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)2
ϕ′(p)
F ′(p)
+ ∂
∂y
R2(y; q)
∣∣∣∣
y=F(p)
. (3.29)
Therefore, the equation in (3.27) in fact implies that the left and the right derivative of W at
F(p) are equal (smooth fit). (Recall that W (x) = ρx + τ y on [F(p), F(d)].) Similarly, the
second equation in (3.27) implies that the left and the right derivative of W at F(d) are equal.
This can be also expressed as: “R2 shifted by an appropriate amount is tangential to the line
l(y) = ρy + τ” at F(p).
3. Next, we vary q and c to find the best band policy. Such a search can easily be carried out in
Mathematica.
To obtain an explicit expression for g in (3.14) and r in (3.20) we make the following assumption.
We will assume that σt = σ > 0 (a constant) in (3.2). Now, we can obtain g in (3.14) (see
Appendix A) explicitly as
g(ξ) = A
µ
r − b + (b + δ)µ+ 12σ 2µ− 12σ 2µ2
ξµ − w
r + δ ξ ≡ k1ξ
µ + k2ξ. (3.30)
Note that if r < b, then g(ξ) = ∞, which implies that taking no action is optimal. The
assumption in Proposition 3.1 that max(c1− c2, c3+ c4) < |k2| is for technical reasons, however
it is not very restrictive. k2 denotes the present value of the total wage that a firm pays per unit
of marginal revenue product of labor and it should be greater than costs associated with one
time hiring or firing of one unit of marginal revenue product of labor. Using (3.30) we can also
calculate r in (3.20) explicitly as (see Appendix A)
r(ξ, c) = e(b−r)∆[−(c3 + c4)e−(b+δ)∆ξN (d1)+ (c1 − c2)e−(b+δ)∆ξN (−d1)
+ c3cN (d2)− c1cN (−d2)− k1 exp()ξµ − k2e−(b+δ)∆ξ + k1cµ + k2c]
(3.31)
in which
d1 ,
1
σ
√
∆
log
(
ξ
c
)
+
(
1
2
σ 2 − (b + δ)
) √
∆
σ
,
d2 ,
1
σ
√
∆
log
(
ξ
c
)
−
(
1
2
σ 2 + (b + δ)
) √
∆
σ
,
 , −
(
b + δ + 1
2
σ 2(1− µ)
)
µ∆.
(3.32)
Here the function x → N (x), x ∈ R, denotes the cumulative distribution function of an
N (0, 1) (standard Gaussian) random variable. The infinitesimal generator A of the process ξ
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Table 1
Measuring the effects of delay
ρ τ p q c d
∆ = 0 0.0002003 38.1633 1.0664 2.125 7.240 35.728
∆ = 0.5 0.0001725 38.1597 1.0661 2.100 7.120 36.640
is Au(x) , (σ 2/2)x2u′′(x)− (b+ δ)xu′(x), acting on smooth test functions u(·). Therefore the
fundamental solutions of the equation (A+ (b − r))u = 0 are
ψ(x) , xβ1 , ϕ , xβ2 , (3.33)
in which β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots of the following quadratic equation (in terms of β)
1
2
σ 2β2 −
(
1
2
σ 2 + (b + δ)
)
β + b − r = 0. (3.34)
The next proposition justifies the second stage of our algorithm.
Proposition 3.1. For a given (q, c) ∈ R2, such that (c1q − (k1qµ + k2q)) < 0 there
exits a unique solution (p∗, d∗) to the system of equations (3.27) if we further assume that
max(c1 − c2, c3 + c4) < |k2|. Moreover, u p∗,q,c,d∗(x) = sup0<p<d u p,q,c,s(x), x ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.8. Also, see the remark below. 
Remark 3.2. The proof of Proposition 3.1 only relies on the following properties of the functions
R1 and R2 defined in (3.23): (1) There exists a point j ∈ (0,∞) such that y → R1(y; c) is
concave and increasing on ( j,∞); (2) limy→∞ R1(y; c) = ∞; (3) The function y → R2(y, q)
is increasing and concave on (0, t) for some t < F(q) and decreasing on (t,∞); (4) Both
y → R1(y; c) and y → R2(y, q) are differentiable.
Our results in this section can be generalized to the two-sided control of any one-dimensional
diffusion and penalty functions satisfying the conditions in Remark 3.2. It is worth pointing
out that Weeransinghe [25] has studied the two-sided bounded variation control within the
framework of singular stochastic control of linear diffusions for a large class of cost functions
by using the functional relationship between the value function of optimal stopping and that of
singular stochastic control (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve [16]).
3.3. Numerical example
In this section, we will give a numerical example for the labor problem with and without delay.
We select the parameters as b = 0.03, r = 0.06, µ = 0.75, σ = 0.35, δ = 0.1, A = 5, w =
2,∆ = 0.5, c1 = 0.05, c2 = 0.1, c3 = 2 and c4 = 1. The results we obtain are summarized in
Table 1 and Fig. 2:
Both the slope ρ and the intercept τ are greater in the no-delay case and therefore, the value
function corresponding to the no-delay problem vN (x) will dominate over that of the delay
problem vD(x). On the right boundary, we have (7.240, 35.728) ⊂ (7.120, 36.640) and on
the left boundary the (c, d) pair has shifted to the left with delay. As a result, the continuation
region (p, d) has expanded with delay: CN , (1.0664, 35.728) ⊂ (1.0661, 36.640) , CD . An
explanation for this phenomenon can be made through the relative size of costs of firing and
hiring, the size of delay parameter, the shape of g function, etc. In our example, the firing cost is
relatively larger than hiring cost, the penalty of firing becomes smaller with delay (than without
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Fig. 2. (a) The graph of g(x). (b) The graph of r(x, c∗) for ∆ > 0. (c) The graph of line ρ∗y + τ∗ we obtain via
our algorithm and R1(y, c∗) after it is shifted vertically by e(b−r)∆(ρF(c) + τ) ϕ(c)ϕ(F−1(y)) . (d) The graph of the line
ρ∗y+τ∗ and R2(y, c∗) after it is shifted (see (3.28) for the amount of shift). (e) The two value functions, vN (x) (∆ = 0)
above and vD(x) (∆ > 0) below. (f) Plot of difference, vN (x) − vD(x). (f) Plot of difference, vN (x) − vD(x). (g) (h)
The derivatives match at x = p and x = d (∆ > 0).
delay) which encourages the controller not to make hasty firing decisions, facing relatively large
firing costs. Or since there is a chance that the process moves to the left during the delay period
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due to voluntary quits, this effect may help to reduce firing costs even though the decision making
is postponed.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we give a new characterization of the value function of one-sided and two-sided
impulse control problems with implementation delays. We also provided easily implemented
algorithms to find out the optimal control and the value function. Our methodology bypasses the
need to guess the form of solution of quasi-variational inequalities and prove that this solution
satisfies a verification lemma. Since our method directly finds the value function, we believe
that this method can solve a larger set of problems than just with quasi-variational inequalities.
Indeed, we applied our results to solving some specific examples. As an important application of
a two-sided impulse control problem with decision delays we found out the optimal hiring and
firing decisions of a firm facing regulatory delays and stochastic demand.
Here we considered a problem in which the decision maker needs to decide whether to take
action and, after some delay, needs to decide the magnitude of her action. In the future, we
will consider problems in which the decision maker takes action and waits for that action to
be implemented. We will also consider a general characterization of the value function and the
optimal controls when the decision delay is not a constant but depends on the magnitude of the
action taken as in Subramanian and Jarrow [24] or it depends on the value of the state variable
that is controlled as in Alvarez and Keppo [3].
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to the the referee for his/her detailed comments that helped us improve the
manuscript. E. Bayraktar was supported in part by the National Science Foundation, under grant
DMS-0604491.
Appendix A
A.1. Derivations of (3.14) and (3.31)
Using (3.11) we can write (3.14) as
g(ξ) = Eξ0
[∫ ∞
0
Aµξµe(b−r)t exp
(
−(b + δ)µt − σµBt − 12σ
2µt
)
dt
]
−wEξ0
[∫ ∞
0
ξ exp
(
−(b + δ)t − σ Bt − 12σ
2t
)
dt
]
= Aµξµ
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
t
(
b − r − (b + δ)µ− 1
2
σ 2µ+ 1
2
σ 2µ2
)]
dt
−wξ
∫ ∞
0
exp(−(b + δ)t)dt, (A.1)
from which we obtain (3.30) under the assumption that r > b. Here the second inequality follows
from Fubini’s theorem and using the Laplace transform of Bt .
In what follows we will present the derivation of (3.31). We can write (3.20) as
r(ξ, c) = e(b−r)∆Eξ0[(−c3(ξ∆ − c)− c4ξ∆)1{ξ∆>c} + (−c1(c − ξ∆)− c2ξ∆)1{ξ∆<c}
− k1ξµ∆ − k2ξ∆ + k1cµ + k2c]. (A.2)
356 E. Bayraktar, M. Egami / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 117 (2007) 333–358
Using (3.11) and the assumption that σt = σ ∈ R+, we compute
A , Eξ0
[
1{ξ∆>c}
] = N (d2), B , Eξ0 [1{ξ∆<c}] = 1− A = N (−d2),
C(θ) , Eξ
[
ξ θ∆
] = ξ θ exp(−(b + δ + 1
2
σ 2(1− θ)
)
θ∆
)
,
(A.3)
where θ = 1 or θ = µ. Here the third equality follows from the Laplace transform of Bt . We
will also need to compute
D , Eξ0
[
ξ∆1{ξ∆>c}
]
. (A.4)
We will denote
κ = exp
(
−1
2
σ 2∆+ σ√∆η
)
,
in which η = B∆/
√
∆, is an N (0, 1) random variable. Then ξ∆ = ξ exp(−(b + δ)∆)κ and
A = ξe−(b+δ)∆Eξ0
[
1{ξ∆>c}κ
]
. Introducing a new probability measure Q by the radon–nikodym
derivative dQξ/dPξ0 = κ , we get
D = e−(b+δ)∆ξQξ (ξ∆ > c).
Under the measure Qξ , n , −η − σ√∆ is N (0, 1) and we can write ξ∆ in terms of n as
ξ∆ = ξ exp
(
−
(
b + δ − 1
2
σ 2
)
∆+ σ√∆n
)
. (A.5)
Using (A.5), we can compute
D = ξe−(b+δ)∆N (d1), (A.6)
in which d1 is given by (3.32). We can then immediately obtain,
E , Eξ0
[
ξ∆1{ξ∆<c}
] = ξe−(b+δ)∆(1− Qξ (ξ∆ > c)) = ξe−(b+δ)∆N (−d1). (A.7)
Using (A.2)–(A.4) and (A.7) we obtain (3.20).
A.2. A technical lemma
Lemma A.1. Define
G(x, γ ) , sup
τ∈S
Ex [e−ατ (h(X0τ )+ γ e−α∆)], x ∈ R, γ ∈ R,
for some Borel function h. Then for γ1 > γ2 we have that
G(x, γ1)− G(x, γ2) ≤ γ1 − γ2.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 3.3 in Dayanik and Egami [11]. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2.8
The proof follows from the analysis of the function r . The following remark will be helpful
in the analysis that follows.
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Remark A.1. Let us denote H(y) , (h/ϕ) ◦ (F−1(y)), y > 0. If h(·) is twice-differentiable at
x ∈ I and y , F(x), then H ′(y) = m(x) and H ′′(y) = m′(x)/F ′(x) with
m(x) = 1
F ′(x)
(
h
ϕ
)′
(x), and H
′′
(y)[(A− α)h(x)] ≥ 0, y = F(x), (A.8)
with strict inequality if H
′′
(y) 6= 0.
A.3.1. The analysis of the function r in (2.47)
Let us check the sign of
(
r
ϕ
)′
(x) = r ′ϕ−rϕ′
ϕ2
(x) which is the same as the derivative of R as
can be observed from the first equation in (A.8). The sign of
(
r
ϕ
)′
(x) is the same as that of
√
2α
α
(
x2 − a2 +∆− 2αλ∆ exp
(
− (a − x)
2
4∆2
)
− cα
)
+ λ(a − x)
(
− 1
∆
exp
(
− (a − x)
2
4∆2
)
+ 1
∆
φ
(
a − x
∆
)
+√2α
(
2N
(
a − x
∆
)
− 1
))
+ 2x
α
+ λ
(
2N
(
a − x
∆
)
− 1
)
. (A.9)
Using the fact 2N
( a−x
∆
)
< 1 for x > a and − 1∆ exp
(
− (a−x)24∆2
)
+ 1∆φ
( a−x
∆
)
< 0 for x > a
sufficiently large, in this equation (for sufficiently large x) we identify the absolute value of the
negative terms as
√
2α
α
λ∆ exp
(
− (a−x)24∆2
)
<
√
2α
α
λ∆, cα and |λ (2N ( a−x∆ )− 1)| < λ. Since
these negative terms are bounded, if we take sufficiently large value, say a′, the sign of (A.9)
is positive for x ∈ (a′,∞). Moreover, we can directly calculate limy→+∞ ∂∂y R(y; a) = 0 to
check the behavior of R(y; a) for large y. We also know that R(y; a) , (r(·, a)/ϕ(·)) ◦ F−1(y)
is negative at y = F(a). On the other hand, 1/ϕ(F−1(y)) = √y is an increasing and concave
function. It follows that R(y; c)+ γ
ϕ(F−1(y)) is an increasing function on y ∈ (F(a′),∞).
To investigate the concavity of R(y; a), we set
q(x, a) , 1
2
x2
λ
∆
(
e−
(a−x)2
∆
(
1− 2(a − x)
2
4∆2
)
− 3φ
(
a − x
∆
)
− λ(a − x)φ′
(
a − x
∆
))
+αx2 − αr(x, a)
so that (A − α)r(x, a) = q(x, a) for every x > 0. We have limx→∞ q(x) = −∞ if α < 4. By
the second equation in (A.8), the function R(y; a) becomes concave eventually. Since R(·; a) is
increasing and concave on (a′′,∞) for some a′′ > a′ and limy→∞ R(y; a) = ∞ we can find a
unique linear majorant to Rγ (·, a) in Lemma 2.3 (the linear majorant majorizes Rγ (·, a) in the
continuation region and is equal to Rγ (·, a) in the stopping region). The rest of the proof is as in
Proposition 2.7.
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